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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A DOCTOR'S DUTY TO
WARN A PATIENT'S SEXUAL PARTNER THAT THE
PATIENT HAS AIDS AND A DOCTOR'S DUTY TO
MAINTAIN PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
In June 1981 the United States Centers for Disease Control officially
reported the first case of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).'
Since 1981 the number of persons infected with the AIDS virus has increased
steadily. 2 At present, no cure for AIDS exists. 3 Unless researchers develop
a cure, all AIDS victims eventually will die from the disease. 4 As the number
of reported cases of AIDS infection and AIDS-related deaths grows, the
public's fear of AIDS also grows creating many difficult ethical and legal
issues.- One legal issue is whether to impose tort liability on individuals
1. See Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control AIDS, 24 HARv.
J. oN LEGIs. 315, 316 (1987)(discussing nature of AIDS crisis).
2. See Baruch, AIDS in the Courts:. Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165, 169 (1987). Between June
1981 and October 19, 1987, the total number of AIDS cases reported to the Centers for
Disease Control rose from 87 to 43,533. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, UNITED STATES AIDS
PROGRAM, AIDS WEEKLY SuRvE ILuCE REPORT at 5 (Oct. 19, 1987). As of January 1986 the
time necessary for the total number of reported cases to double was 11 months. Id. Although
the number of AIDS cases is increasing, the rate of increase is decreasing. Comment, supra
note 1, at 316 n.3. In 1983 the 2,124 reported cases of AIDS constituted a 184% increase
over the number of reported cases for 1982. Id. In 1984 the number of reported AIDS cases
increased 115% over the number of reported cases for 1983. Id. Finally, in 1985, the 8,406
reported cases of AIDS constituted an 84% increase over the number of reported cases for
1984. Id. The Centers for Disease Control estimates that by 1991, at least 270,000 American
AIDS cases will develop, with 179,000 deaths. Baruch, supra, at 168. For the purposes of this
article, any reference to infected persons, AIDS patients, carriers, or victims includes individuals
who are suffering from any of the AIDS-related conditions discussed in note 18, supra.
3. United States Public Health Services, Facts about AIDS, in AIDS: LEGAL PoLicms
11, 12 (1985) (discussing nature of AIDS crisis).
4. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 169 (discussing nature of AIDS crisis). As of June
1986, 55% of known AIDS patients had died, including at least 71% of AIDS patients
diagnosed prior to July 1984. Id. at 168; see infra note 18 (discussing various stages of AIDS
infection).
5. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 165 (discussing AIDS-related legal issues). The issues
surrounding AIDS include whether to impose tort liablity on individuals who are responsible
for the sexual transmission of the disease. See generally id. (discussing tort liability for sexual
transmission of AIDS). A person who has contracted the AIDS virus through sexual contact
with an AIDS carrier has several theories upon which to base his lawsuit. Id. at 173. These
theories include negligence, battery, negligent misrepresentation, deceit or fraudulent misrep-
resentation, and emotional distress. Id. at 173, 175-76, 178-79. Under the negligence theory of
recovery for the transmission of the AIDS virus, a person would be liable if he failed to use
ordinary care to avoid transmitting the AIDS virus to another individual. Id. at 174. The
requisite elements for a cause of action for battery are intent and offensive physical contact.
Id. at 176. The offensive contact element exists when the alleged transmission of AIDS occurs
through sexual contact. Id. To satisfy the offensive contact element, the plaintiff does not
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responsible for the transmission of the AIDS viruS.6 Another legal issue
that courts soon will face is the liability of physicians and health care
workers for failing to provide AIDS-related information to persons who are
at risk of contracting the AIDS virus from identified carriers.7 Public policy,
common sense, and court decisions indicate that a physician of a known
have to prove that the defendant actually intended to spread the virus. Id. The plaintiff must
show only that the defendant was substantially certain that the spread of the disease would
result from his conduct. Id. Thus, an AIDS carrier would be subject to liability for battery if
he consented to sexual relations with another person, knowing that the person does not realize
that the carrier has AIDS. Id. Under the negligent misrepresentation theory, an AIDS carrier
would be liable to another person if the person could establish that the two elements of the
cause of action exist. Id. at 177. The first element of a negligent misrepresentation cause of
action exists if the carrier intends or reasonably should know that his statement as to his
AIDS status will cause his sexual partner to rely on the statement's accuracy. Id. The second
element exists if the carrier either knows his statement is false or has failed to ascertain whether
the statement is true. Id. A plaintiff states a cause of action for deceit or fraudulent
misrepresentation if he alleges that an AIDS carrier knowingly misrepresented the carrier's
AIDS status with the intention of inducing the plaintiff to have sexual relations with the
carrier in reliance on the misrepresentation. Id. at 178. The plaintiff can recover damages for
any injury resulting from his justifiable reliance on the carrier's misrepresentation. Id. Finally,
under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a carrier may be liable to a
person to whom the carrier has transmitted the AIDS virus. Id. at 179. The requisite element
for an emotional distress cause of action is outrageous conduct which an AIDS carrier knows
or should know is likely to cause actual injury or severe emotional distress to another person.
Id.
Another AIDS-related issue is how doctors may secure from AIDS patients informed
consent in the medical context. See generally, Weldon-Linne, Weldon-Linne, & Murphy, AIDS-
Virus Antibody Testing: Issues of Informed Consent and Patient Confidentiality, 75 ILL. B.
J. 206 (1986) (discussing issues of informed consent in AIDS context). The doctrine of informed
consent consists of a health care provider's duty to warn patients of the material risks of
medical treatment, the possible complications that may develop during the course of medical
treatment, the risks and comparative benefits of the alternatives to the proposed treatment,
and the effect on the patient of nontreatment. Id. at 208. In the context of AIDS testihg, the
health care provider should describe the test, its limitations, the possible effects of releasing
test results, and any exceptions to the guarantee of doctor-patient confidentiality. Id. at 209-
10. Because of the negative repercussions of a positive AIDS antibody test result, informed
consent should be a mandatory requirement whenever a patient undergoes HTLV-III antibody
testing. Id. at 208; see supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination against
AIDS victims).
Whether to impose criminal liability on an AIDS carrier for intentionally transmitting to
another person the AIDS virus is another important AIDS-related issue. See generally, Wei-
senhaus, AIDS Criminal Laws, Cases Rise, NAT'L L.J. July 20, 1987, at 3 (discussing criminal
liability for transmission of AIDS virus). For example, in Los Angeles, law enforcement
officials charged a person with attempted murder for selling his AIDS-contaminated blood.
Id. at 3. In Minnesota, a federal jury found an AIDS infected prison inmate guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon after he bit a prison guard. Id.
6. See generally, Baruch, supra note 2, at 173-80 (discussing tort liability for sexual
transmission of AIDS); Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages
for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L. RFv. 185 (1988) (discussing tort
liability for transmission of HTLV-III).
7. See Hermann, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U. CoLo. L. Rev.
63, 74 (1987) (discussing potential liability of physician for patient's transmitting AIDS virus
to third person).
AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY
AIDS carrier has a moral and legal duty to warn the carrier's spouse or
sexual partner that the carrier is infected with the AIDS virus.8 A confidential
relationship exists, however, between a doctor and his patient 9 Therefore,
in establishing a duty to warn, courts should consider the strong need to
protect doctor-patient confidentiality in the AIDS context. 10 As the legal
issues surrounding AIDS become more complex, achieving a balance between
an AIDS victim's right to privacy and confidentiality and the public's desire
to slow the spread of AIDS will become increasingly more important."
AIDS destroys a victim's natural immunity against disease.' 2 An AIDS
victim is vulnerable to serious, "opportunistic" diseases that do not pose a
threat to a person whose immune system is functioning normally. 3 An
opportunistic disease attacks an individual after other diseases or drugs have
lowered the individual's resistance to infection. 14 The human T-lymphotropic
virus type III (HTLV-III) causes AIDS. 5 Medical personnel use the AIDS
antibody test to detect an individual's exposure to the AIDS virus. 16 A
8. See infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text (discussing physician's duty to warn
sexual partner of patient that patient has AIDS).
9. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing confidential relationship
between doctor and patient).
10. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing need for confidentiality in
AIDS context).
11. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 315 (discussing merits of protecting
confidentiality of AIDS test results in effort to control AIDS); infra notes 39-51 and accom-
panying text (discussing need for doctor-patient confidentiality in AIDS context).
12. United States Public Health Services, supra note 3, at 11.
13. See id. (discussing diseases that afflict AIDS victims). The most common opportunistic
infections associated with AIDS are Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) and Kaposi's
Sarcoma (KS). See Comment, You Never Told Me... You Never Asked; Tort Liability for
the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. Rav. 529, 531 (1986) (discussing diseases that
afflict AIDS victims). PCP is a parasitic infection of the lungs. See United States Public
Health Services, supra note 3, at 12 (describing diseases that afflict AIDS victims). Patients
suffering from PCP may be only slightly feverish, but are likely to be extremely weak, suffer
from shortness of breath, and have dark bluish skin coloration because of a deficiency of
oxygen in the blood. STEDM u'S MEDICAL DicTIoNARY 435, 349, 1109 (5th unabridged lawyer's
ed. 1982). KS is a malignant type of cancer that usually occurs on the surface of the skin or
in the mouth. See United States Public Health Service, supra, note 3, at 12. In its early stages,
KS may look like a bruise or a violet-blue spot. Id. The spot persists, however, and may grow
larger. Id. Additionally, KS spreads to other organs in the body. Id.
14. See United States Public Health Services, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing opportunistic
diseases associated with AIDS); STEDMN'S MEDICAL. DicrIONARY 990 (5th unabridged lawyer's
ed. 1982) (defining opportunistic disease).
15. See Comment, supra note 1, at 316 (discussing causes of AIDS). The three names
for the AIDS virus are human T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III), the lymphadenopathy
associated virus (LAV), and the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV). Id.
16. See id. at 167 (discussing detection of AIDS virus). Medical personnel detect exposure
to HTLV-III by using the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). See Henry, AIDS in
the Workplace, in AIDS AND Tm LAW 31, 34-35 (1987) (discussing detection of AIDS virus).
The ELISA test does not detect the presence of the virus in the body but, instead, detects the
presence of HTLV-III antibodies. Id.
The ELISA test begins with a plastic sheet covered with a thin layer of the AIDS virus
1988]
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positive antibody test result does not indicate whether a person carries the
AIDS virus, 7 nor whether the person has full-blown AIDS or will develop
the disease in the future.' A doctor diagnoses a person as having full-blown
AIDS only when an opportunistic infection has afflicted the person and the
doctor can detect no other cause of the infection. 9 Approximately twenty-
five to fifty percent of those persons who test positive for the AIDS
antibodies will develop full-blown AIDS within five to ten years from the
date of exposure to the virus.
20
proteins. See Hermann, supra note 7, at 64 n.7 (describing ELISA test). A laboratory technician
then adds serum from the tested person, followed by chemicals to produce a color reaction.
Id. The technician then uses a spectrophotometer to read the color changes and detect the
presence of antibodies. Id. Finally, the technician grades the presence of antibodies to indicate
the strength of any positive result. Id.
The antibody test itself does not determine whether an individual has AIDS. Weldon-
Linne, supra note 5, at 207. Instead, a positive test result simply indicates that the person
tested may have been exposed to the HTLV-III virus and has developed antibodies. Baruch,
supra note 2, at 167. Although the antibody test is relatively reliable, it sometimes yields false
positive results. Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 207. Initially, researchers developed the ELISA
test to screen blood donors for exposure to the AIDS virus. Henry, supra, at 35. The ELISA
test is approximately 99.8% accurate. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 207. In other words,
out of every 1,000 persons tested, two persons who have not been exposed to the virus and
have not developed antibodies will have positive test results. Id. The imperfect accuracy is
significant in the testing of low risk populations because, with low risk groups, most positive
antibody test results will be false positives. Id.; see infra note 24 and accompanying text
(discussing groups of persons who are at high risk of contracting AIDS virus). For example,
if a population of 100,000 people with an incidence of HTLV-III infection of 0.1% underwent
AIDS antibody tests, approximately 300 persons would have positive test results. See Weldon-
Linne supra note 5, at 207. Two hundred of the 300 individuals with positive test results
would have false positive results. Id. Only 100 (33%) actually would be infected with the
AIDS virus. Id. Medical personnel may use the Western Blot, a more accurate antibody test,
to confirm the ELISA test result. Henry, supra at 35. The Western Blot, however, also is not
100% accurate. Id.
17. See United States Public Health Services, supra note 3, at 12 (describing significance
of positive AIDS test result).
18. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 167 (discussing significance of positive AIDS test result).
The general public uses the term "AIDS" to refer to all HTLV-III-related conditions. Henry,
supra note 16, at 34 (discussing various categories of AIDS infection). The broad use of the
term "AIDS" is technically incorrect. Id. Three basic conditions associated with HTLV-III
infection exist. Id. The first condition is antibody seropositivity, or a positive test result. Id.
Individuals who have been exposed to the virus and have developed antibodies, but have no
symptoms of AIDS fall into the category of antibody seropositivity. Id. A great majority of
persons exposed to the AIDS virus are part of this group. Id. The second condition associated
with HTLV-III infection is AIDS-related complex (ARC). Id. ARC is a nonfatal condition
and is significantly less severe than full-blown AIDS. Id. Symptoms of ARC include fever,
fatigue, weight loss, swollen lymph glands, night sweats, and diarrhea. Id. Of those individuals
with ARC, from 5% to 20% eventually will develop AIDS. Id.
Full-blown AIDS is the third HTLV-III related condition. Id. Only this condition is
medically classified as AIDS. Id. The presence of opportunistic diseases indicates that a person
has full-blown AIDS. Id. The opportunistic diseases are fatal to the AIDS victim. Id.
19. See Wolfe, Legal Aspects of AIDS, 8 WmT=R L. Rsv. 503, 506 (1986) (describing
opportunistic diseases that afflict AIDS victims). Chemotherapy also causes immune deficiency
and vulnerability to opportunistic infections. Id.
20. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing nature of AIDS infection).
AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY
An AIDS victim carries HTLV-III in his blood and semen. 2' The carrier
transfers the AIDS virus to another person through sexual contact, shared
hypodermic needles, and blood transfusions. 22 Although researchers and
medical professionals are uncertain of when a carrier's infection with the
AIDS virus is contagious, the United States Public Health Service assumes
that persons who repeatedly test positive for the virus can transmit the virus
to other people.23
As more people become infected with HTLV-III, courts increasingly
will have to resolve issues surrounding the rights of AIDS victims. For
example, courts will have to determine the rights and duties of an AIDS
patient and his doctor in the context of the doctor-patient relationship.- 4
Physicians, the public, legislatures, and the courts long have recognized that
a confidential relationship exists between a doctor and his patient.2- A
physician's legal duty of confidentiality has evolved over time.26 The phy-
21. See Brigham, supra note 13, at 532 (discussing transmission of AIDS virus). In
addition to finding HTLV-III in the blood and semen of AIDS carriers, researchers have
isolated trace amounts of the virus in tears and saliva. Id. Studies have shown, however, that
AIDS is not spread through the air and a person cannot contract the virus through casual
contact with an infected person. Id.
22. See United States Public Health Services, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing transmission
of AIDS virus).
23. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 171 (citing United States Public Health Service
recommendations for avoiding transmission of AIDS virus). The medical community considers
at risk for transmitting the AIDS virus all persons who are antibody seropositive and suggests
that infected persons take certain precautions to prevent exposure to uninfected persons. Id.
An infected person may take precautions that include not donating blood or body organs,
using condoms during sexual activity, and not sharing hypodermic needles with other persons.
See United States Public Health Services, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing measures that AIDS
infected persons may take to prevent transmission of AIDS virus). Studies show that, although
approximately 80% to 95% of the individuals who test positive for the AIDS antibody do not
develop full-blown AIDS within the first few years after exposure to the HTLV-III, they are
capable of transmitting the virus to other people. See Henry, supra note 16, at 35 (discussing
transmission of AIDS virus).
Ninety-four percent of all AIDS cases have occurred in six high risk groups. See Baruch,
supra note 2, at 168. Sixty-five percent of the people who are at risk of developing AIDS are
homosexual and bisexual men who do not use intravenous drugs. Id. Seventeen percent of the
people who are at risk are heterosexual intravenous drug users. Id. Homosexual and bisexual
men who use intravenous drugs account for 8% of the people who are at risk of developing
AIDS, and recipients of blood or blood products account for 2%. Id. Both heterosexual
partners of AIDS victims and hemophiliacs account for 1% of the people who are likely to
develop AIDS. Id. at 169.
24. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing liability of doctors and patients
in AIDS context).
25. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (discussing common law and statutory
recognition of right to doctor-patient confidentiality).
26. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (recognizing physician's moral and legal duty to maintain doctor-patient confidentiality).
A doctor's moral duty not to disclose information that he obtains from a patient during the
course of medical treatment has existed for centuries. Id. The Hippocratic Oath supports the
doctor's duty of confidentiality, stating: "[all that may come to my knowledge in the exercise
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sician's duty arose out of the recognition that a promise of confidentiality
is necessary to encourage patients fully to disclose all information relevant
to effective medical treatment.2 A patient's right to confidentiality is part
of the right to privacy, which the United States Constitution implicitly
guarantees to all persons.2 8 The right to privacy protects an individual from
the unlimited disclosure of certain types of personal information. 29 For
example, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a person's
medical records fall within the constitutional zone of privacy. 30 In most
jurisdictions, a patient may recover from a physician for wrongful disclosure
of confidential information.3 1 Courts have entertained several theories of
recovery for a physician's breach of confidence, including invasion of
privacy, statutory violations, breach of implied contract, and tortious vio-
lation of the duty to protect confidentiality.3 2 Every state, to some extent,
of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I
will keep secret and will never reveal." STEDmAN's MEDiCAL DICTIONARY 650 (5th unabridged
lawyer's ed. 1982). Historians attribute the Hippocratic Oath, an ethical code, to the ancient
Greek physician, Hippocrates. 5 TnE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrTANNICA 939 (15th ed. 1985).
27. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02. In Hammonds
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio stated that the honesty
which the promise of confidentiality elicits from a patient is necessary for effective medical
treatment. Id. at 801. A patient should not be hesitant, reserved, or reluctant to discusss his
problems with his doctor. Id. The patient certainly intends that the doctor will keep the
patient's disclosure private. Id. If a doctor were to reveal any of the patient's confidences,
the doctor would invade the privacy of his patient. Id.; see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text (discussing doctor's invasion of patient's right to privacy).
28. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 210 (discussing constitutional right to privacy in
doctor-patient context).
29. See Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987). In Tarrant County the defendant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge
to rescind his order that required the defendant hospital to produce certain documents
identifying blood donors. Id. at 676. Although it recognized that the United States Constitution
protects the confidentiality of medical records, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's order did not violate the blood donors' right to privacy. Id. at - . The appeals
court explained that the trial court's order did not violate the donors' rights to privacy because
the donors' need for anonymity was no greater than the plaintiff's need to know the identities
of the donors to prove her claim against the defendant. Id. The court further explained that
the order itself protected the donors' privacy. Id. The order directed the plaintiff not to
contact any of the donors or disclose the names of the donors to third parties. Id.
30. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601 (1977). In Whalen the United States Supreme
Court implicitly held that, although the United States Constitution protects the confidentiality
of medical records, a statute requiring physicians to report to the state the names of patients
who obtain certain classes of drugs does not violate the patients' rights to privacy. Id.
31. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (stating that doctor warrants that doctor will not release, without patient's consent, any
confidential information that the doctor gains through relationship with patient); Home v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, - , 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (1974) (stating that confidential relationship
between doctor and patient imposes on doctor duty not to disclose information which doctor
obtains during patient's treatment); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, - , 479 N.E. 2d 113,
119 (1985) (stating that physician owes patient duty not to disclose medical information which
doctor gains in course of doctor-patient relationship), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
32. See generally, Note, Duty to Warn Versus Duty to Maintain Confidentiality: Con-
AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY
statutorily protects the confidentiality of medical records.
3
flicting Demands on Mental Health Professionals, 20 SuroLK U. L. REv. 579, 595-604 (1986)
(discussing various theories of recovery for doctor's breach of confidence).
33. See CoMPnATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 1984-85 2 (R. Smith ed.
1984) (discussing state statutes protecting confidentiality of medical records). Many state statutes
provide for a doctor-patient privilege that gives a patient the right to exclude from evidence
in civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings any communications made between the patient
and his doctor during the course of medical treatment. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1983)
(stating that patient has privilege to refuse to disclose or prevent witness from disclosing in
civil action any communication made between patient and physician during patient's treatment);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (Supp. 1987) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West
1976) (same); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.235 (1987) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (1979) (stating
that patient has privilege to refuse to disclose or prevent witness from disclosing in evidence
communications made between patient and psychotherapist during patient's treatment for
mental condition); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.215 (Baldwin 1972) (same); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1984) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-504 (1978) (same); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp. 1987) (same); ARK. R. EvID. 503 (1979) (stating that patient
has privilege to refuse to disclose or prevent witness from disclosing in evidence communications
made between patient and physician or psychotherapist relating to treatment of patient's
physical, mental, or emotional condition); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-504 (1985) (same); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 49.225 (1957) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (Supp. 1988) (same); S.D.
CODIFIED LAVs ANN. § 19-13-7 (1979) (same); VT. R. EviD. 503 (1983) (same); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1987) (same). Other states do not require a patient to assert the
doctor-patient privilege, but instead prohibit a doctor from testifying without the patient's
consent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1982) (excluding from evidence communications made
between psychiatrist and patient unless patient consents); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (Supp.
1987) (prohibiting health care professional from testifying without patient's consent about
communications made between patient and professional during patient's medical treatment);
N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399
(1984) (same); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1956) (prohibiting physician from testifying
without patient's consent about communications made between patient and physician during
patient's treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (1982) (same); HAw. R. EvID. 504 (1985)
(same); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(4) (1979) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (Smith-
Hurd 1984) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 140.3 (West 1972) (same); MICH. Com. LAws ANN.
§ 600.2157 (West 1986) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595-.02(d) (West Supp. 1988) (same);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1985) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1987)
(same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1943) (same); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Baldwin
1984) (same); 28 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 42 § 5929 (Purdon 1982) (same); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1987) (same); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1987) (same); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986) (declaring that physician is incompetent to testify about communi-
cations made between physician and patient during patient's medical treatment); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1949) (same); N.D. R. EvID. 503 (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-24
(Supp. 1987) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987) (same). Some states have statutes that
require confidentiality of mental health records. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146h (West
Supp. 1987) (requiring that mental health records which mental health facility issues to
commissioner of mental health contain no identifying data); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp.
1987) (requiring that administrator of public hospital keep confidential records of patient's
treatment for mental illness); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34A, § 3003 (Supp. 1986) (requiring
that department of mental health keep confidential all records pertaining to patient's treatment);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.845 (1984) (declaring that mental health records are confidential); W.
VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1986) (same). Additionally, a few states have statutes protecting the
confidentiality of venereal disease records. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-22 (Supp. 1987) (stating
that all information and reports concerning persons infected with sexually transmitted diseases
1988]
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Despite the constitutional right to privacy, a patient's right to confi-
dentiality in the doctor-patient relationship is not absolute.3 4 Various excep-
tions to the general rule of privacy exist under the common law.3 5 For
example, a physician must not disclose any information a patient supplies
to the physician during the course of medical treatment unless statutory law
requires disclosure or disclosure is necessary to protect the welfare of the
patient or public.3 6 Out of the public welfare exception to a doctor's duty
of confidentiality, more specific exceptions have developed. 37 The exceptions
include the duty to warn third parties who are likely to have contact with
a patient whom a doctor has diagnosed as having a contagious disease and
the duty to warn individuals to whom a doctor believes a dangerous patient
poses a threat.3 8
are confidential); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-4-402 (1973) (requiring doctor who treats case of
venereal disease to file with health authorities reports containing name and address of infected
person only when doctor believes person is menace to another individual's health); DEs.. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 702 (1983) (requiring physician, hospital and laboratory to file with board of
health confidential reports of venereal disease cases); 28 PA. CODE § 27.92 (1987) (requiring
confidentiality of premarital syphilis test results); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135 (Law. Co-op.
1976) (requiring department of health to keep confidential names of known or suspected
venereal disease carriers). Finally, some states have statutes generally ensuring the confidentiality
of medical records. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.10 (Supp. 1987) (prohibiting health care provider's
disclosure to third person of any medical information regarding patient without patient's
consent); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West Supp. 1987) (containing patient's bill
of rights providing right to confidentiality of all medical records and communications to extent
law allows); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West Supp. 1987) (declaring that medical case
discussion, consultation, examination, and treatment are confidential); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-
37.3-4 (1987) (requiring organizations that keep medical information to adopt policies to insure
confidentiality of records); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504 (Supp. 1987) (requiring that state
facilities keep confidential patient's medical records); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447(d)
(Vernon 1976) (requiring state department of health to keep confidential all medical information
that identifies individuals).
34. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 210 (discussing exceptiong to patient's tight to
doctor-patient confidentiality). A doctor's duty to preserve the public health qualifies a patient's
right to confidentiality. Id. In some circumstances the doctor's duty to prevent the spread of
disease or protect third persons from harm supersedes the patient's right to confidentiality.
See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing limits of patient's right to confiden-
tiality).
35. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing common law exceptions to
rule of doctor-patient confidentiality).
36. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 441-42, 551 P.2d 334,
347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (citing from PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETMcs OF TE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 9 (1957)). The Tarasoff court explained that the American Medical
Association has recognized an exception to a doctor's duty of confidentiality. Id. (citing
PRINCIPLEs OF MEDICAL ETHICs). The exception arises when a doctor reasonably determines
that disclosure to a third person is necessary to protect the patient or the public welfare. Id.
(citing PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS).
37. See infra notes 53-111 and accompanying text (discussing common law exceptions to
doctor's duty of doctor-patient confidentiality).
38. See id. (discussing doctor's duty to warn in contagious disease and psychotherapy
cases).
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In deciding whether similar exceptions to the duty of confidentiality
apply in the AIDS context, courts should acknowledge that maintaining
doctor-patient confidentiality in the AIDS context is extremely important.
39
Control of the AIDS epidemic depends upon voluntary testing of persons
who are at a high risk of contracting AIDS or who believe that an AIDS
carrier has exposed them to HTLV-III.40 The most important sources of
AIDS-related information are reports of positive antibody test results and
diagnosed cases of full-blown AIDS. 41 If the public health community is to
obtain AIDS-related information as quickly as possible, potentially infected
individuals must take part in voluntary AIDS testing and research. 42 Because
of the discrimination and ostracism that AIDS victims face, the fear that a
physician will disclose to the public the results of the AIDS antibody test
may discourage potentially infected persons from volunteering for testing.
43
39. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 211 (discussing need for confidentiality in AIDS
context). The AIDS Interdisciplinary Advisory Committee has stated that maintaining confi-
dentiality is essential to protect the privacy and dignity of the patient and achieve public health
objectives. Id. at 211 n.40. The Committee has recommended that health care providers make
every effort to prevent disclosure of the identities of AIDS victims and persons infected with
HTLV-III. Id. A doctor's unwarranted disclosure of information about an AIDS victim can
cause serious negative repercussions in the victim's life. See infra note 43 (discussing discrim-
ination against AIDS victims).
40. See Gostin & Curran, The Limits of Compulsion in Controlling AIDS, in AIDS:
THE LEGAL CoMPLEXrIEs OF A NATioNAL CRisis 44, 45-46 (1987) (discussing need for voluntary
AIDS testing). Existing public health policy encourages individuals at a high risk of contracting
AIDS to volunteer for testing. Id. The testing is necessary to determine whether the person
tested has been exposed to HTLV-III. Id. Public health policy also encourages high risk
individuals to have their test results reported to the public health department and then to
change their sexual behavior. Id. Cooperation between public health officials and individuals
who have a high risk of contracting the AIDS virus is essential to achieving the public health
objective of preventing the spread of AIDS. Id.
41. See Comment, supra note 1, at 315 (discussing sources of AIDS-related information).
AIDS-related information is necessary for the treatment of AIDS patients, research to find a
cure, and attempts to inform the public about the nature of the disease. Id.
42. See id. (discussing need for potentially infected persons to volunteer for AIDS
testing).
43. Id. at 319. The public's misperception of AIDS and its risks has created exaggerated
fear and behavior. Id. at 321. The unnecessary fear of contracting the virus through casual
contact has led many people to fear association with AIDS victims. Id. Public disclosure by
a doctor or laboratory of a positive antibody test result could have a serious impact on an
infected person's employment, insurability, reputation in the community, and personal rela-
tionships. See Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MiD. 131, 161 (1986) (discussing. discrimination against
AIDS victims). Property owners have evicted homosexuals and AIDS carriers from housing
because of misperceptions of the risk of contagion through casual contact. See Marco, AIDS
1986: A Medical-Legal Explosion, 33 MED. TRiAL TECH. Q. 360, 364 (1987) (discussing
discrimination that AIDS victims face). For example, a family whose three hemophiliac children
were infected with the AIDS virus had to move from its home when arsonists set fire to the
home. See Voboril, The Castaways, Lnm, Oct. 1987, at 98. The arsonists burned the home
after the children attempted to attend a local school. Id. Furthermore, insurance companies
have attempted to avoid providing insurance coverage to AIDS victims because of the high
medical costs associated with the disease. See Comment, supra note 1, at 322 (describing
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Additionally, because many antibody tests yield false positive results, and
the presence of antibodies in a person's blood does not necessarily indicate
the existence of AIDS, predict future illness, or imply a risk of contagion,
disclosure to the public would not significantly inform the public of a
danger and would discourge voluntary testing." Therefore, the assurance of
patient confidentiality is essential in the fight to contain the spread of
AIDS.45
Noting the need to ensure patient privacy, the Centers for Disease
Control has recommended, in a published list of suggestions for reducing
further transmission of AIDS, that doctors provide more protection of
patient confidentiality." Similarly, the American Hospital Association has
recommended that hospitals take special care to insure the confidentiality
of information pertaining to the treatment of AIDS patients. 47 Furthermore,
the American Medical Association has called for legislation to protect the
confidentiality of antibody test results unless withholding the test results
would threaten the public health. 8 Finally, Senator Edward Kennedy has
acknowledged the need for strong safeguards to insure confidentiality in the
AIDS context. 49 Kennedy has introduced into the Senate a bill that, in
addition to authorizing funds for increased voluntary testing of possible
AIDS carriers and counseling of AIDS victms, seeks to protect the confi-
discrimination against AIDS victims). The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed
suit against Prudential Insurance Company of America in federal district court in New York
City claiming that the insurance company tested a man for the AIDS virus without the man's
consent. See Ricklefs, AIDS Cases Prompt a Host of Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987, at
37, col. 3. Prudential denied insurance coverage to the man after he tested positive for the
AIDS antibodies. Id. Many employers have fired, refused to hire, or failed to promote known
AIDS carriers, perceived infected persons, and members of high risk groups. See Comment,
supra note 1, at 322. For example, Ratheon Company is appealing a California ruling which
declared that Ratheon owes back pay to the estate of John Chadbourne, whom the company
refused to reinstate in a job because Chadburne had AIDS. See Ricklefs, supra, at 37, col. 3.
Vincent Chalk, a teacher, is suing the Orange County, California school system to allow Chalk
to return to teaching. Id. The school system transferred Chalk to office duties after the system
learned that Chalk had AIDS. Id. Likewise, schools have excluded students who are infected
with HTLV-III. See Marco, supra, at 364. Finally, many people have called for the quarantine
of AIDS infected persons. See Comment, supra note 1, at 365.
44. See Marco, supra note 43, at 366 (discussing need for confidentiality of AIDS test
results).
45. Id.
46. See Comment, supra note I, at 326 (discussing suggestions by Centers for Disease
Control for reducing transmission of AIDS).
47. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 211 (discussing American Hospital Association
recommendations for hospitals that treat AIDS patients).
48. See Rovner, AMA Opposes Reagan on AIDS Testing, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1381, 1381 (1987) (discussing American Medical Association recommendations for AIDS
legislation).
49. See Rovner, Waxman, Kennedy Offer Bills Ensuring Privacy of AIDS Tests, 45
CoNG. Q. WEaKLY REP. 1744, 1744 (1987) (describing Congressional bills relating to confiden-
tiality in AIDS context).
AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY
dentiality of AIDS antibody test records. 0 In addition, some states have
adopted legislation that includes safeguards for the confidentiality of AIDS
antibody test results. 5' Currently, California has the most comprehensive
AIDS confidentiality statute.
52
50. Id. Section 2315 of Senate Bill 1575, which Senator Edward Kennedy introduced on
July 31, 1987, requires that an organization which receives funds under the bill agree to ensure
the confidentiality of information and records regarding individuals to whom the organization
provided AIDS counseling and testing. S. 1575, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2315, 133 CONG.
REc. 128, 11058 (1987). Section 2318 requires that an organization which receives funds under
the bill offer opportunities for an individual to receive AIDS counseling and testing without
the organization's requiring that the individual provide any information about the individual's
identity. Id. § 2318. Furthermore, section 2331 of the bill prohibits a person who receives
identifying information about a protected individual through direct or indirect involvement in
the process of the individual's AIDS counseling and testing from disclosing the information
to a third party. Id. § 2331. Sectiob 2337 of the bill defines identifying information as
information that reveals the identity of a protected individual and that the individual has
undergone or will undergo AIDS counseling or testing. Id. § 2337(2). Section 2337 also states
that a protected individual is an individual who has undergone AIDS counseling or testing,
regardless of whether the federal government funded the testing. Id. § 2337(3). In addition,
section 2331 of the bill establishes a civil money penalty, civil causes of action, and a criminal
penalty for violating the prohibition against disclosure of information that identifies a protected
individual. Id. § 2331(c). A protected individual who is aggrieved as a result of another
person's disclosure may obtain actual or punitive damages in a civil action against the person
who made the disclosure. Id. § 2311(c)(2). Section 233 1(c) also states that the award of damages
shall not be less than $2,000. Id. § 2331(c)(4).
51. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & S AT CODE § 199.20 (West Supp. 1988) (prohibiting, in
judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, compulsion of person to identify AIDS test
subjects); id. § 199.21 (establishing penalties for unauthorized disclosures of AIDS test results);
id. §§ 199-30-199.40 (establishing AIDS Research Confidentiality Act); id. §§ 199.42-199.44
(establishing AIDS public health records confidentiality act); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2805 (Supp.
1987) (protecting confidentiality of medical records of and information about persons with
AIDS); FLA. STAT. AN. § 384.25(2) (West 1986) (requiring that public health department
adopt rules to protect privacy and confidentiality of patients with sexually transmitted diseases
including AIDS); id. § 384.26(2) (requiring that health department keep confidential all
information it gathers in course of sexual contact investigation); id. § 384.29 (requiring that
public health department maintain confidentiality of all information and records relating to
cases of sexually transmissible diseases including AIDS); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.410(2)
(1985) (including AIDS within definition of "sexually transmitted diseases" in Kentucky
Sexually Transmitted Disease Control Confidentiality Act of 1986); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, §§ 19203-19206 (Supp. 1987) (protecting confidentiality of AIDS test results and providing
for civil liability for unauthorized disclosure of AIDS test results), MAss. GEN. L. ch.111, §
70F (Supp. 1987) (protecting confidentiality of AIDS test results); infra note 52 (discussing
pertinent sections of California AIDS Research and AIDS Public Health Records Confidentiality
Acts).
52. See CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE §§ 199.20-25 (West 1988) (requiring confidentiality
of AIDS blood test result to protect public health); id. §§ 199.30-40 (establishing AIDS
Research Confidentiality Act); id. §§ 199.42-44 (establishing AIDS Public Health Records
Confidentiality Act). While other states simply have included AIDS within the scope of existing
statutes protecting the confidentiality of medical records or have drafted short statutes relating
to AIDS testing, the California Legislature enacted extensive statutes protecting AIDS test
results in a variety of contexts. Id. For example, section 199.20 of the California Health &
Safety Code prohibits, in a judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding, a person from
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In some instances, however, a doctor's duty to protect the public health
may override a patient's right to confidentiality.53 For example, in Simonsen
v. Swenson54 the Supreme Court for the State of Nebraska held that a
doctor's privilege to disclose a patient's confidential information when
disclosure is necessary to prevent the spread of a contagious disease may
overcome the doctor's duty of confidentiality. 5 The Simonsen court ex-
plained that a doctor may give a warning about his patient's contagious
disease to persons who are likely to contract the disease from the patient.
6
In justifying its decision, the Simonsen court noted that a physician has an
obligation to prevent disease.57 The Simonsen court further observed that
expecting a doctor to remain silent while his patient exposes healthy indi-
viduals to the disease is unreasonable.5 8
testifying about the identity of AIDS test subjects. Id. § 199.20. Section 199.21 establishes
penalties, including monetary damages for the unauthorized disclosure of AIDS test results.
Id. § 199.21. Section 199.22 states that no person shall test another person's blood for AIDS
antibodies without the tested person's written consent. Id. § 199.22. Section 199.25, however,
relieves a physician of liability for disclosing a positive test result to the spouse of an AIDS
test subject. Id. § 199.25
California's Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Research Confidentiality Act requires
a researcher to keep confidential AIDS research records which identify an individual. Id. §
199.30. The person possessing the confidential research records cannot disclose the records to
third parties. Id.
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Public Health Records Confidentiality Act
declares that public health records relating to AIDS which contain personally identifying
information shall be confidential. Id. § 199.42(a). The agencies shall not disclose AIDS-related
information, except as the law requires for public health purposes, or pursuant to written
authorization either by the person who is the subject of the record, or by his or her guardian
or conservator. Id.
53. See Kmentt, Private Medical Records: Are They Public Property? 33 MED. TALa
TECH. Q. 274, 289 (1987) (explaining that doctor's duty to protect public health may override
patient's right to confidentiality).
54. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
55. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 225, , 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920). In Simonsen
the plaintiff alleged a breach by the defendant doctor of the doctor's duty to maintain doctor-
patient confidentiality. Id. The doctor in Simonsen had informed the operator of the hotel in
which the plaintiff was staying that the doctor thought the plaintiff was suffering from syphilis.
Id. at - , 177 N.W. at 831. The Simonsen court noted that a person infected with syphilis
readily transmits the disease in its early stages. Id. For example, drinking cups, eating utensils,
and other objects that the infected person has used may carry the syphilis virus. Id.
56. Id. at __ , 177 N.W. at 832.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Simonsen court explained that a patient cannot expect that, if his doctor
finds that the patient's illness is contagious, the patient still can insist that the doctor keep
secret the patient's condition. Id. The Simonsen court stated that, although the information
that a patient gives to his physician is confidential, the patient must give that information to
the physician subject to qualifications. Id. According to the Simonsen court, if the patient's
disease is so contagious in nature that the patient will transmit the disease to other persons
unless the doctor discloses the danger of contagion to them, the doctor may make whatever
disclosure is necessary to prevent the spread of the disease. Id. The Simonsen court assumed
that the patient necessarily would understand that, when the patient's disease is highly
contagious, the doctor may disclose information about the patient's illness. Id. Thus, the
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Furthermore, in a number of cases courts have stated that a physician
not only may disclose certain information to persons who are at risk of
contracting a contagious disease from a patient, but also has an affirmative
duty to notify all persons who are in proximity to a patient that the patient
has a contagious or infectious disease.5 9 For example, in Skillings v. Allen,
6°
the Supreme Court for the State of Minnesota recognized that a physician
owes individuals who are likely to be in proximity to a patient a duty to
warn of the contagious nature of the patient's illness.61 The court explained
that, when a person foreseeably will cause injury to another person if he
does not use due care in his conduct, the person is responsible for the direct
consequences of his negligent acts. 62 Thus, the Skilings court held that the
doctor owed a duty to the parents of his minor patient to advise the parents
of the infectious nature of the patient's illness. 63
Similarly, in Davis v. Rodman,64 the Supreme Court for the State of
Arkansas ruled that, in treating a patient who has a contagious disease, a
physician has a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn members of the
patient's family and other persons who are likely to contact the patient that
the patient's affliction is contagious. 65 The Davis court explained that a
doctor owes persons who are ignorant of the patient's disease and who,
because of family ties, are likely to be in proximity to the patient, a duty
Simonsen court reasoned, the doctor's disclosure would not be a breach of the patient's
confidence. Id.
59. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn
persons who are likely to contract contagious disease from doctor's patient).
60. 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919).
61. Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, -, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919). In Skillings a
physician who was treating the daughter of the plaintiff for scarlet fever failed to warn the
plaintiff and his wife that their daughter's illness was infectious. Id. at - , 173 N.W. at
663. The doctor also negligently advised the plaintiff's wife that visiting her daughter in the
hospital and removing the child to the plaintiff's home was safe. Id. Upon the child's return
to the plaintiff's home, the plaintiff and his wife contracted scarlet fever. Id. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the physician had a duty to advise the plaintiff and his wife of
the infectious character of the disease. Id. at -, 173 N.W. at 664. The court determined
that the doctor had a duty properly to advise the child's parents because they were more likely
than anyone else to be exposed to the infection. Id.
62. Id. at __ , 173 N.W. at 663-64.
63. Id. at _, 173 N.W. at 664.
64. 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921).
65. Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, -, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921). In Davis the
Supreme Court of Arkansas explained that a contagious disease is one which a person contracts
by casual contact with persons suffering from the disease, or through secretions or objects
that the patient has touched. Id. at -, 227 S.W. at 613. In Davis the defendant doctor
was treating two of the plaintiffs' children for typhoid. Id. The doctor failed to notify the
plaintiffs that typhoid was a contagious disease. Id. Because of the failure to notify, the
plaintiffs and three other children contracted typhoid. Id. One child died from the disease.
Id. Although the Davis court found that the doctor had breached his duty to notify the
plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the
doctor's breach proximately caused the plaintiffs and their children to contract the disease.
Id. at - , 227 S.W. at 614.
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to advise them about the nature of the disease.6 6 Furthermore, in Jones v.
Stanko,67 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a doctor is negligent in
failing to notify persons who are in proximity to a patient of the patient's
contagious disease. 68 The Jones court futher held that the doctor also is
liable to a third party for any injury to the third party resulting from the
doctor's failure to notify.69 Finally, in Hofmann v. Blackmon,70 the Florida
District Court of Appeals held that once a doctor diagnoses a patient as
having a contagious disease, the doctor has a duty to use reasonable care
in advising and warning family members of the contagious nature of the
patient's illness. 71 The Hofmann court held that the doctor's failure to
diagnose the contagious disease does not relieve the doctor of his duty.
72
In a recent line of cases, state courts have extended a doctor's duty to
protect the public health to include the duty to warn third parties of the
foreseeable dangerous conduct of his patient. 73 Although these cases involve
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, they are analogous to the physician-
AIDS patient relationship. 74 In 1976 the Supreme Court for the State of
66. Id. at -_, 227 S.W. at 614.
67. 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
68. Jones v. Stanko, 188 Ohio St. 147, - , 160 N.E. 456, 458 (1928). In Jones the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the defendant doctor. Id. at - , 16 N.E.
at 456. The plaintiff's decedent had contracted smallpox from a neighbor and died. Id. The
decedent had asked the doctor about the nature of the neighbor's illness. Id. The doctor,
having negligently failed to diagnose the neighbor's smallpox, informed the decedent that the
neighbor was not suffering from a contagious disease. Id. Additionally, the doctor negligently
explained that the decedent was not at risk of contracting the disease by caring for the
neighbor during the neighbor's illness. Id. Relying on the doctor's assurances that the neighbor's
disease was not contagious, the plaintiff's decedent cared for the neighbor prior to the
neighbor's death, and performed services in preparation for the neighbor's burial. Id. The
Jones court held that the doctor's failure properly to warn the plaintiff proximately caused
the decedent's death. Id. at ,160 N.E. at 457.
69. Id.
70. 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
71. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied,
245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971). In Hofmann the plaintiff father and his minor child brought an
action against the estate of the father's physician, who failed to diagnose the father's
tuberculosis. Id. As a result, the plaintiff's child contracted the disease and required extensive
medical treatment. Id.
72. Id. In Hofmann the Florida District Court of Appeals explained that if a doctor
determines that a patient has a contagious disease the doctor has a duty to warn the members
of the patient's immediate family of the nature of the disease. Id. The defendant doctor
contended that he owed no duty to the plaintiff because the doctor did not actually know the
tuberculosis existed. Id. The Hofmann court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that
the defendant's negligence in failing to diagnose the contagious disease did not negate the
defendant's duty to warn. Id. The court held that relieving the defendant of his duty to warn
because the defendant breached his duty to diagnose the disease would be illogical. Id.
73. See infra notes 74-111 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn third
parties of foreseeable violence by patient).
74. See Hermann, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing whether physician has duty to warn
patient's family members that patient has AIDS). See generally Marco, supra note 43 (discussing
possible lawsuits against doctors for patient' transmission of AIDS virus). Spouses and sexual
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California, in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,7s held that
if a therapist determines, or according to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence
toward a particular individual, the therapist incurs an obligation to use
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against the danger. 76 In
Tarasoff the patient confided to the therapist the patient's intention to kill
the plaintiffs' daughter. 7 The therapist did not warn the plaintiffs or the
plaintiffs' daughter about the patient's threat. 78 Approximately two months
later the patient killed the plaintiffs' daughter. 9 The plaintiffs asserted that
the therapist breached his duty to warn them or their daughter that the
patient had threatened their daughter. 0 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the
therapist's failure to warn proximately resulted in their daughter's death s.8
According to the Tarasoff court, the duty to protect the potential victim
of a patient may require that the therapist take one or more of various
steps, depending upon the nature of the case, to prevent the patient from
harming the potential victim.8 2 The court explained that, if a person occupies
a position that enables the person to prevent injury to another person, a
duty arises to exercise ordinary care to prevent the injury. 3 The Tarasoff
partners of AIDS patients already have brought lawsuits against patients for transmitting the
AIDS virus to the partner. Id. Sexual partners of AIDS patients also have brought lawsuits
alleging both that the patients failed to disclose the patients' AIDS infection, and that the
patients intentionally caused their partners to suffer emotional distress. Id.
75. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
76. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976). In Tarasoff the parents of Tatiana Tarasoff brought an action
against the University of California Regents, the psychotherapists at the University of California
at Berkeley student health center, and the campus police, after Prosenjit Poddar, a patient
the psychotherapists treated, killed Tatiana. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychotherapist employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the
University of California, had been treating Poddar, a graduate student, for mental illness. Id.
at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. Two months before the killing, Poddar had
confided to Moore that Poddar intended to kill a woman who was identifiable as Tatiana. Id.
Moore alerted campus police that Poddar was dangerous and that the police should commit
Poddar to a psychiatric facility. Id. The campus police took Poddar into custody, but released
Poddar when he promised to stay away from Tatiana. Id. Tatiana's parents claimed that each
of the defendants had an affirmative duty to warn Tatiana or her parents of the danger
Poddar posed to Tatiana. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
82. Id. The Tarasoff court explained that the steps which a therapist may take to
discharge his duty to protect third persons from a patient's violence include warning the
intended victim or other persons, such as the victim's family, who are likely to apprise the
victim of the danger, notifyir~g the police of the patient's potential for violence, or taking any
other actions that are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Id. The therapists in
Tarasoff notified the campus police of Poddar's potential for violence. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d
at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
83. Id. at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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court further explained that, if a person can prevent foreseeable harm to a
third party by controlling the actions -of a dangerous person or warning the
third party of the dangerous action, the common law has imposed on the
person a duty to protect the potential victim.8 4 The person has this duty,
however, only if he has some special relationship to the dangerous individual
or to the potential victim of the dangerous person's conduct."5 Accordingly,
the Tarasoff court ruled that the special relationship between the patient
and the therapist imposed on the therapist a duty to protect the plaintiffs'
daughter .
6
In establishing the therapist's duty to warn individuals whom his patient
has threatened, the Tarasoff court referred to the contagious disease line
of cases.8 7 The court explained that other jurisdictions had held that the
doctor-patient relationship imposes on a doctor the duty to use reasonable
care to protect other individuals from danger that might result from a
patient's illness."' Recognizing that therapists encounter difficulties in at-
tempting to determine whether a patient presents a serious threat of violence
to other individuals, the Tarasoff court explained that a therapist must
exercise only the reasonable skill that members of his profession ordinarily
exercise in similar circumstances.8 9 The court held that, if a therapist
determines, or under professional standards should determine, that his
patient poses a serious threat of danger to a foreseeable victim of his
patient's conduct, the therapist has a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect the foreseeable victim from harm.9
While recognizing the importance of maintaining confidentiality between
a therapist and his patient, the Tarasoff court also explained that it must
weigh the public interest in safety from violent assault by mental patients
against the need for confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship. 9
84. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
87. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24. The Tarasoff court proposed that
the relationship between a doctor and his patient is sufficient to support the doctor's duty to
use reasonable care to protect other persons against dangers arising from the patient's illness.
Id. In support of its proposition, the court cited the contagious disease cases. See id. (citing
Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d
752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919); Jones
v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928)).
88. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. According to
the Tarasoff court, by entering into the doctor-patient relationship, a therapist becomes
sufficiently involved with the patient to justify imposing on the therapist the responsibility for
the safety of his patient and any other persons whom the therapist knows the patient has
threatened to harm. Id.
89. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The Tarasoff court failed to
mention any concrete standards that a therapist must follow in determining whether a patient
presents a serious threat of violence to other persons. Cf. id. (stating that therapist must warn
persons whom patient has threatened).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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The court noted that the California state legislature already had recognized
the need to balance the competing interests of the public and the individual
patient.9 To support the proposition that therapist-patient confidentiality
must yield if disclosure of the patient's dangerous propensities is essential
to prevent danger to foreseeable victims, the court cited California Evidence
Code section 1024. 93 Section 1024 establishes that communication between
a therapist and his patient is not privileged if disclosure of the patient's
potential for violence is necessary to prevent threatened harm to a third
person.9 4 The Tarasoff court also stated that, in disclosing a patient's
confidential information to prevent harm to a third person, a therapist
would not violate professional ethics. 9
In addition to California, other jurisdictions also have held that a
therapist owes third persons whom a patient has threatened to harm a duty
to warn of the patient's dangerous propensities. 96 These jurisdictions have
attempted to clarify the Tarasoff ambiguities as to whom and when a
therapist owes a duty to warn.9 7 Shortly after the Tarasoff decision, in
McIntosh v. Milano" the Superior Court for the State of New Jersey held
that a therapist may have a duty to warn a potential victim of the therapist's
92. Id.
93. Id.; see CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1965)(containing exception to confidentiality
of therapist-patient relationship).
94. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26. The California
Evidence Code contains a limited exception to the therapist-patient privilege. Id.; see CAL.
Evxn. CODE § 1024 (West 1965) (containing exception to confidentiality of therapist-patient
relationship). The exception applies when the therapist reasonably believes that the patient is
in a condition that is dangerous to the patient or to other persons and that disclosure is
necessary to prevent the danger. Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (citing from
California Evidence Code); see CAL. Evm. CODE § 1024 (West 1965) (containing exception to
confidentiality of therapist-patient relationship).
95. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26. The Tarasoff
decision, which created a therapist's duty to warn foreseeable victims of his patient's violent
actions, was not unanimous. Justice Clark dissented from the majority decision, arguing that
overwhelming policy considerations weigh in favor of the duty of confidentiality rather than
a therapist's duty to warn of a patient's foreseeable violence. Id. at 457, 551 P.2d at 358, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that imposing on a psychiatrist
a duty to warn a potential victim would frustrate psychiatric treatment, invade the patient's
rights, increase violence, and offer virtually no benefit to society. Id. at 458, 551 P.2d at 358,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark believed that protecting confidentiality
was important for three reasons. Id. at 458, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). First, Justice Clark explained, persons in need of treatment will avoid seeking help
unless the therapist gives them an assurance of confidentiality. Id. Second, full disclosure of
all relevant information by a patient to his therapist is necessary for the therapist effectively
to treat the patient, and the guarantee of confidentiality will encourage disclosure. Id. Finally,
the dissent explained, the therapist's assurance of confidentiality will foster the trust necessary
for effective treatment. Id.
96. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text (discussing Tarasoff and other psy-
chotherapy cases).
97. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions deciding to
whom and when psycotherapist has duty to warn).
98. 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
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patient if the victim clearly is the object of the patient's aggression."
Similarly, in Leedy v. Hartnett,'00 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that a therapist has a duty to warn
particular, identified victims of the danger the therapist's patient has posed. 10
In Cairl v. State'02 the Supreme Court for the State of Minnesota also held
that a therapist has a duty to warn only if a patient makes specific threats
to harm specific individuals. 03 In Brady v. Hopper'04 the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that a therapist owes no
duty to warn third persons about his patient's violent tendencies, absent
99. McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, -, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12. In McIntosh
the plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for wrongful death after the doctor's patient murdered
the plaintiff's daughter. Id. at - , 403 A.2d at 502. During the patient's treatment for a
mental condition, the patient confided to the doctor that the patient had been sexually involved
with the decedent. Id. at -, 403 A.2d at 503. The defendant knew that the patient had
possessive feelings toward the decedent. Id. The patient confided to the defendant that the
patient once had fired a B.B. gun at the decedent's car. Id. Thus, the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant should have known that the patient posed a serious threat of violence to the
decedent. Id. at __ , 403 A.2d at 505. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had
a duty to warn the decedent or the decedent's parents of the patient's threat. Id. The Superior
Court for the State of New Jersey held that the doctor had a duty to warn the decedent
because the decedent clearly was an object of the patient's aggression. Id. at - , 403 A.2d
at 512.
100. 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Penn. 1981), aff'd 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1982).
101. Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (M.D. Penn. 1981), aff'd 676 F.2d 686
(3d Cir. 1982). In Leedy v. Hartnett the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant hospital was
negligent in failing to warn the plaintiffs of its patient's violent tendencies. Id. at 1126. While
visiting the plaintiffs' home, the patient assaulted the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that
the hospital had a duty to protect them because the hospital knew that the patient had a
tendency toward violence when drinking alcohol and that the patient was planning to stay
with the plaintiffs when he left the hospital. Id. at 1127. Although, in Leedy, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recognized that a mental health
care provider has a duty to warn the identifiable victims of a patient's dangerous conduct,
the court found that the hospital owed the plaintiffs no duty. Id. The court denied relief to
the plaintiffs because they had argued that the hospital had failed to confine the patient, not
that the hospital had failed to warn the plaintiffs. Id.
102. 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982).
103. Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Minn. 1982). In Cairl a boarding student set fire
to Cairl's apartment building while the student was visiting his family on holiday leave from
the Minnesota Learning Center at Brainerd State Hospital. Id. at 21. Cairl sued the State of
Minnesota, the Ramsey County Welfare Department, and certain state and county employees
for damages arising out of the destruction of Cairl's building. Id. Plaintiff, Connelly also
sought damages for the death of one daughter and injuries to another daughter that occured
during the fire. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that, because the student had a history of starting
fires, the hospital was negligent in releasing the student. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that
the defendants breached their duties to warn the plaintiffs of the student's dangerous propen-
sities. Id. In Cairl, the Supreme Court for the State of Minnesota held that the hospital had
a duty to warn only if the patient made specific threats against specific individuals. Id. at 26.
The court explained that the hospital had no duty to warn the plaintiffs because the student
did not present a threat to specific victims. Id. In particular the court explained that the
student did not pose to the plaintiffs a danger that was any different from the dangers he
posed to any member of the public. Id.
104. 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984).
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specific threats by the patient to harm identifiable victims. 105 In Bardoni v.
Kim'06 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that, if a plaintiff claims that
a therapist should have known of the existence and identity of a patient's
victims, the plaintiff must show that the therapist readily could identify the
target of the patient's violence. 0 7 The Bardoni court explained that the
plaintiff also must show that, according to professional standards, the
therapist should have known that the readily identifiable person was the
target of his patient's threat of violence.'01 In Sharpe v. South Carolina
Department of Mental Health'09 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a therapist does not have a duty to warn the general public that a
hospital has released a dangerous mental patient." 0 These courts and the
Tarasoff court have created a rule that mental health professionals have a
legal duty to warn the identified and foreseable victims of the professionals'
patients, in addition to having a legal and professional duty to provide
confidential medical care for their patients."'
105. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Stipp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd 751 F.2d 329
(10th Cir. 1984). In Brady a former patient of the defendant psychiatrist shot and seriously
injured the plaintiffs in the patient's attempt to assassinate President Reagan. Id. at 1334. The
plaintiffs sued the psychiatrist for failing to warn third persons of the danger that the patient
posed to the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the psychiatrist should have warned the
patient's parents of their son's dangerous tendencies. Id. at 1335. The plaintiffs further argued
that the psychiatrist should have warned the police of the patient's potential for political
assassination. Id. at 1335. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held
that the psychiatrist owed no duty to warn because the patient had not made specific threats
to harm identifiable victims. Id. at 1338.
106. 151 Mich. App. 169, 390 N.W.2d 218 (1986).
107. Bardoni v. Kim, 151 Mich. App. 169, 181, 390 N.W.2d 218, 224 (1986). In Bardoni
the plaintiffs, survivors of the decedents, sued the defendant doctor after his patient killed the
patient's mother and brother. Id. at 174, 390 N.W.2d at 221. The plaintiffs claimed that the
doctor negligently failed to diagnose the patient as dangerous to members of the patient's
family and failed to warn the family of the patient's potential for violence. Id. The Michigan
Court of Appeals denied relief to the plaintiffs, explaining that the patient had not shown any
signs of violent behavior directed toward the plaintiffs or any other readily identifiable victims.
Id. at 182, 390 N.W.2d at 225.
108. Id. at 181, 390 N.W.2d at 224.
109. 292 S.C. 11, 354 S.E.2d 778 (S.C. App. 1987).
110. Sharpe v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, -, 354 S.E.2d
778, 780 (S.C. App. 1987). In Sharpe the administrator of the decedent's estate brought a
wrongful death action against the Department of Mental Health and certain doctors. Id. at
-, 354 S.E.2d at 779. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had a duty to warn the
community when the defendants released a patient with a history of mental illness and violence.
Id. The Sharpe court held that the defendants had no duty to warn the general public that
the defendants had released a dangerous patient. Id. at - , 354 S.E.2d at 780.
111. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345-
46, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25-26 (1976)(discussing to whom doctor owes duty to warn of patient's
violent tendencies); see also, Crocker, Judicial Expansion of the Tarasoff Doctrine: Doctors'
Dilemma, 13 J. PsYCmATRY & L. 83, 88 (1985)(discussing Tarasoff and other psychotherapy
cases); Greenberg, The Evolution of Tarasoff: Recent Developments in the Psychiatrist's Duties
to Warn Potential Victims, Protect the Public, and Predict Dangerousness, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 315, 322 (1984). In his article, Dr. Linn Greenberg discusses a Pennsylvania general
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Tarasoff and the other psychotherapy cases, and the cases considering
contagious disease and a doctor's duty to warn persons who are likely to
contract the disease from the doctor's patient seem to indicate that a
physician has, or should have, a duty to warn the spouse or sexual partner
of a known AIDS carrier that the carrier is HTLV-III infected., 2 If a duty
to warn exists, a doctor must consider the duty along with the importance
of maintaining doctor-patient confidentiality and ensuring the privacy of
the AIDS patient."3 An AIDS patient's right to confidentiality in the doctor-
patient relationship has been an issue in recent lawsuits." 4 Third parties
district court case in which the court held that a psychotherapist practicing under Pennsylvania
law may not disclose confidential information without the patient's consent even when the
patient presents a serious threat of violence to a third person. See Greenberg, supra at 322
(discussing Hopewell v. Adebimpe). Additionally, in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska imposed on a psychiatric hospital a
duty to protect a class of persons from a patient's violence if the hospital reasonably could
have foreseen the risk of harm to the class. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 .F. Supp.
185, 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980). The plaintiffs in Lipari did not claim that the hospital failed to
warn them of the patient's dangerous propensities. Id. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that the
hospital did not properly confine the patient. Id. The Lipari court held that, although a
hospital cannot identify the potential victims of the hospital's patient, the hospital has a duty
to prevent injury that the hospital can foresee. Id. at 195. Because the hospital could foresee
the patient's violence, the court held that the hospital was negligent in releasing the patient.
Id.
112. See supra notes 60-111 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn
third parties in contagious disease and psychotherapy cases).
113. See Weldon-Linne, supra note 5, at 210 (discussing balance between doctor's duty
to warn and AIDS patient's right to confidentiality); supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text
(discussing need for confidentiality in AIDS context). Lawrence Gostin, the executive director
of the American Society of Law and Medicine, stated recently that "AIDS spears physicians
on one of the greatest dilemmas, a torturous dilemma-the conflict between the duty to the
patient and the duty to society." N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987, at D20, col. 4.
114. See Delaware Dep't of Correction v. Delaware Public Employees Council 82, Civ.
A. No. 8462 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1987) (WESTLAW, States library, DE-CS file). In Delaware
Department of Correction the Department of Correction challenged the validity of an arbitration
award which determined that the department had violated a provision of a collective bargaining
agreement between the department and the Delaware Public Employees Union. Id. The
provision stated that the department agreed to notify the union president of any inmate who
had, or was medically suspected of having, any communicable disease. Id. The provision
further stated that the department would notify all employees who worked in the area of an
inmate who had, or was medically suspected of having, a communicable disease. Id. After a
Delaware Correctional Center inmate died of AIDS, 20 inmates disclosed to prison officials
that they had engaged in homosexual relations with the deceased inmate. Id. The department
provided the inmates with confidential AIDS tests. Id. Several inmates tested positive for the
virus. Id. The department refused to disclose to the union the names of the inmates who had
positive test results because the department had promised the inmates that the test results
would be confidential. Id. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the provision in the
collective bargaining agreement required the department to act reasonably to ascertain which
inmates in its custody had, or were medically suspected of having AIDS. Id. The court further
held that the department had violated the provision by failing to ascertain the names of
suspected AIDS carriers. Id. Therefore, the court upheld the arbitration award. Id.
In Tarrant County Hospital District v. Hughes, another AIDS-related lawsuit, the defen-
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also have sued doctors for failing to inform them that a particular patient
has AIDS." 5 Members of the medical and legal communities disagree about
the extent and content of a doctor's duty in AIDS cases. 16 State governments
have begun to enact legislation requiring doctors to report the names of
AIDS carriers to public health authorities. 17 Additionally, Senator Kennedy
dant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to rescind his order that required
the defendant hospital to produce certain documents identifying blood donors. 734 S.W.2d
675, 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In the case below, the plaintiff alleged that her daughter's
death was a result of the daughter's contracting AIDS through a blood transfusion and the
names of the blood donors were necessary to prove that the defendant negligently provided
contaminated blood. Id. The Tarrant court held, however, that the trial court's order did not
violate the blood donors' rights to privacy. Id. at 679. The court explained that the trial
court's order did not violate the donors' rights of privacy because the donors need for
anonymity was no greater than the plaintiff's need for the identities of the donors to prove
her claim against the defendant. Id. The court further explained that the order itself protected
the donor's privacy. Id. The order directed the plaintiff not to contact any of the donors nor
disclose the names of the donors to third parties. Id. In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood
Service, Inc., however, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the privacy interests of
volunteer blood donors and society's interest in maintaining a strong volunteer blood donation
system outweighed a plaintiff's interest in discovering the names and addresses of blood donors.
500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987). The plaintiff hoped that further discovery would provide
some evidence that the plaintiff had contracted AIDS from blood transfusions, which she had
received during medical treatment for injuries that were the subject of the suit. Id.
115. See Baruch, supra note 2, at 166, 190 (discussing lawsuit against doctors for failing
to warn patient's sexual partner that patient was suffering from AIDS). Marc Christian, a
former lover of Rock Hudson, who died of AIDS, has filed a lawsuit against Hudson's estate.
Id. at 166. Christian also has sued Hudson's doctors. Id. at 190. Christian has alleged that
Hudson's doctors knew that Hudson had AIDS and was continuing to have sexual relations
with Christian. Id. Christian further has claimed that the doctors never informed him of
Hudson's condition. Id. Christian is suing under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 179 n. 93. As yet, Christian has not tested positive for the presence of the
AIDS antibodies, nor does he suffer from any symptoms of the disease. Id. Similarly, in San
Francisco, California, a hospital nurse has sued a doctor for failing to disclose to the nurse
that a patient whom the nurse was attending suffered from AIDS. Marco, supra note 43, at
361. After learning from the patient whom she had just injected that the patient was suffering
from AIDS, the nurse nervously stuck herself with the needle. Id.
116. See Baruch, supra note 3, at 191 (discussing doctor's duty to warn third persons
that patient has AIDS). Dr- McBride of the District of Columbia Public Health Department
claims that physicians have a duty to warn persons who are likely to have contact with AIDS
patients. Id. Other members of the medical community, such as Jim Graham, director of the
Whitman-Walker AIDS clinic in Washington D.C., do not agree with McBride's description
of the doctor's duty. Id. Attorney Alice Philipson, chairman of the AIDS Legal Referral Panel
in San Francisco, argues that any disclosures by physicians of AIDS patients are unethical
and will accelerate the spread of the disease. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987 at D20, col. 5.
Philipson believes that, if doctors regularly disclose information about their patients' afflictions,
the doctors will violate their duties of confidentiality and will discourage individuals from
volunteering for AIDS testing. Id. Philipson states that to assume that AIDS infected individuals
are irresponsible and intend to hurt the people they love is unreasonable. Id.
117. See AIDS AND m LAw 349, app. P at 349-50. (V. Dornette ed. 1987) (tabulating
state venereal disease reporting requirements). New York state requires that physicians, hospital
administrators, health officers, laboratories, or persons in charge of state institutions fie with
the commissioner of health confidential reports of all cases or suspected cases of AIDS. N.Y.
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has proposed federal legislation that would permit physicians to set aside
confidentiality in certain instances, thus freeing doctors from liability to
patients for informing known sexual partners of HTLV-III infected patients
that the patient is an AIDS carrier."8 Case law supports the contention that
a physician has a duty to warn specific individuals that they potentially are
at risk of contracting the AIDS virus from an identified carrier."19 Accord-
ingly, a doctor of a known AIDS carrier has a duty to warn the carrier's
spouse or sexual partner of the carrier's condition.
Because the best solution to help curb the spread of AIDS is counseling
infected persons to inform voluntarily their sexual partners that the infected
CoMP,. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 24-1 (1985). Similarly, a Florida statute requires that a
person who diagnoses a case of a sexually transmitted disease, including AIDS, file a report
with the health department. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West Supp. 1987). The Florida statute
further requires that the health department establish rules to protect the confidentiality of
AIDS reports. Id. A Maine statute that prohibits a person from disclosing the results of an
AIDS test provides an exception for required disclosures to the department of health. ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17003 (Supp. 1986). Pennsylvania requires physicians and hospitals
to file reports of all AIDS cases with the department of health. 28 PA. CODE § 27.32 (1987).
The reports must contain the name, address, and phone number of the test subject. Id.
118. S. 1575, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2335, 133 CONG. Rac. 128, S11058 (1987). Section
2235 of Senator Kennedy's bill states that, under certain circumstances, a physician or
professional counselor may disclose identifying information about a protected individual. Id.
The bill requires, however, that the person disclose the information only to the spouse of the
protected individual or to an individual whom the protected individual has identified during
the process of professional counseling or testing as a sexual partner of the protected individual.
Id. Finally, the doctor or professional counselor making the disclosure reasonably must believe
that the disclosure is medically appropriate and the protected individual will not provide the
spouse or sexual contact with the identifying information involved. Id.
119. Cf. supra notes 60-111 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to third
parties who are at risk of injury from patient). The psychotherapy cases and contagious disease
cases are distinguishable from cases that may arise in the AIDS context. See supra notes 59-
111 (discussing psychotherapy and contagious disease cases). The psychotherapy cases concern
mental patients well known for their social irresponsibility and who had confided to their
Joctors their intention to harm third persons. See supra notes 72-111 and accompanying text
(discussing Tarasoffand other psychotherapy cases). In the majority of AIDS cases, however,
although a doctor cannot be sure whether a patient poses a specific threat of AIDS transmission
to the patient's sexual partner, most patients are socially responsible and do not intend to
harm anyone they care about. See N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987, at D20, col. 3 (discussing
individual's responsibility to avoid transmitting AIDS virus). Commentators have stated that,
with appropriate counseling, most patients will inform their sexual partners of the potential
danger of continued sexual relations. Cf. Hermann, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing duty to
warn patient's sexual partner that patient has AIDS). The contagious disease cases dealt with
diseases that a patient readily transmits to other persons through casual contact. See Davis v.
Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, - , 227 S.W. 612, 613 (1921); supra notes 60-72 and accompanying
text (discussing contagious disease cases). For example, in Davis v. Rodman, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas explained that a contagious disease is a disease that a person contracts by
casual contact either with a carrier of the disease or with secretions or objects that the carrier
has touched. Davis, 147 Ark. at -, 227 S.W. at 613. An AIDS carrier, however, transmits
the disease primarily through intimate sexual contact, shared needles, or donated blood. See
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing transmission of AIDS virus). AIDS is
not spread through casual contact. Id.
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person carries the AIDS virus, and because assurance of confidentiality is
necessary to encourage persons at high risk of contracting the AIDS virus
to undergo testing, 20 a physician should have a limited duty to warn only
the spouses or sexual partners of AIDS carriers. '2 As in the contagious
disease cases and the psychotherapy cases, a doctor should disclose confi-
dential information to a third party if disclosure is necessary to prevent the
spread of the AIDS virus.' 22 The doctor must act in good faith and disclose
the confidential information only to a person whom the doctor reasonably
believes may be exposed to the disease.' 3
A physician's duty to warn the sexual partner of his AIDS patient arises
out of the relationship between the doctor and his patient. 24 Because of
the unique nature of the doctor-patient relationship, courts have imposed
on doctors the duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting other individuals
to whom the patient poses a dangerous threat. '1 A doctor must take
reasonably necessary steps to protect a person whom the doctor determines
his patient may harm.
126
Because carriers primarily transmit AIDS through sexual relations rather
than casual contact, a doctor should have a duty to warn only the spouse
or known sexual partner of the HTLV-III infected person. 2 7 In the psy-
cotherapy line of cases, courts reasoned that the therapist-patient relationship
imposed on a therapist the duty to warn only specifically identified or
forseeable victims of the patient's conduct. 28 The Tarasoff court, for
example, recognized the unreasonableness of requiring a doctor to interro-
gate his patient or conduct an independent investigation to discover a
120. See Comment, supra note 1, at 319 (discussing need for voluntary counseling and
confidentiality in AIDS context); supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (same).
121. See Dornette, Confidentiality Issues, in AIDS AND TIM LAw 251, 256 (W. Dornette
ed. 1987) (stating that doctors must disclose AIDS test results when disclosure is necessary to
prevent further spread of infection).
122. Cf. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224,.__, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (discussing
times when doctor may disclose confidential information); supra notes 52-71 and accompanying
text (discussing contagious disease exception to doctor's duty of confidentiality).
123. Cf. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, -, 177-N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (explaining
when doctor may disclose to third person patient's confidential information).
124. Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976) (discussing doctor's duty to warn third persons to whom patient
poses danger).
125. See id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (discussing doctor's duty to
warn third persons of danger arising from patient's illness).
126. See McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, -, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (1979)
(discussing doctor's duty to protect persons patient endangers); cf. supra note 82 and accom-
panying text (discussing steps that doctor may take to discharge duty to protect persons from
patient's violence).
127. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (discussing to whom doctor owes duty
to warn in AIDS context). Although an AIDS carrier may transmit the virus through shared
hypodermic needles and donated blood, this paper discusses only a doctor's duty to warn in
the context of the sexual transmission of AIDS.
128. See supra notes 73-111 and accompanying text (discussing to whom therapist owes
duty to warn of patient's dangerous propensities).
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potential victim's identity. 129 The Tarasoff court stated that a doctor owes
a duty to those persons whom the doctor could identify by a "moment's
reflection." 130 Thus, by analogy, in the AIDS context the doctor should not
have to question his patient or undertake a separate investigation to discover
the patient's sexual contacts.1 3' In fact, an investigation may invade the
right to privacy of both the patient and the contact and would impose a
great burden on the doctor by extending the doctor's liability to all persons
whom he failed to warn of the AIDS patient's diagnosis. 32
In the contagious disease cases, the courts found that the doctor had a
duty to warn persons likely to contract the disease from his patient. 3 In
an AIDS case, only the spouse and sexual partners of the AIDS carrier are
apt to contract HTLV-III from the carrier. 34 If persons at a high risk of
contracting AIDS know that their doctors will interrogate them about their
sexual relations, or that their doctors publically will release a positive test
result, these high-risk individuals will hesitate to volunteer for testing. 35
The resulting reduction in the amount of testing would have a serious impact
129. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439 n.11, 551 P.2d 334, 345
n.ll, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 n.11 (1976). But see Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp.
185, 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding that doctor owes duty to warn class of persons that
patient threatens to harm).
130. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439 n.11, 551 P.2d 334, 345
n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 n.ll (1976). In Tarasoff,the Supreme Court for the State of
California explained that, in determining whether a physician should have known that his
patient posed a threat of danger to a specific individual, the court must examine the particular
circumstances of the case. Id.
131. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text (discussing to whom doctor owes duty
to warn of patient's dangerous conduct).
132. See Gostin & Curran, supra note 40, at 45. Gostin and Curran argue against contact
tracing as a public health response to the AIDS crisis. Id. Contact tracing is an investigation
into the sexual contacts of an AIDS carrier. Id. Gostin and Curran argue that the direct public
health benefits of contact tracing would be marginal. Id. They also assert that the use of
intrusive tracing methods would have serious adverse effects on voluntary testing and other
existing public health efforts to curb the spread of AIDS. Id. Gostin and Curran further argue
that doctors' assurances of patient confidentiality will encourage high risk individuals to
volunteer for AIDS testing. Id.
133. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn
persons who are likely to contract contagious diseases).
134. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing transmission of AIDS virus);
see also Hermann, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing whether doctor has duty to warn patient's
family that patient has AIDS). A doctor need not warn family members other than the patient's
spouse or sexual partner that a patient has AIDS because other family members are not at
risk of contracting the virus through casual contact with the AIDS patient. See Brigham, supra
note 13, at 532 (discussing transmission of AIDS virus). Thus, the family members are not
foreseeable victims of harm to whom the doctor owes a duty to warn. See supra notes 73-111
(explaining that doctor owes duty only to foreseeable or identifiable victims of harm patient
poses).
135. See Comment, supra note 1, at 319 (discussing need for doctor's assurances to
patient of privacy and confidentiality to encourage voluntary AIDS testing); supra notes 39-
52 and accompanying text (discussing need for confidentiality in effort to control spread of
AIDS).
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on the spread of AIDS. 3 6 Reductions in voluntary testing for AIDS would
affect the amount of AIDS-related information available for the treatment
of AIDS patients, research to find a cure for the disease, and attempts to
inform the public about AIDS. 37 Furthermore, persons who would avoid
AIDS testing because of the negative implications of a positive test result
would continue to spread the disease, unaware that they were HTLV-III
carriers. 38 The number of persons who would avoid testing likely would
exceed the small number of sexual partners who would avoid contracting
the disease because of a warning from a doctor. 3 9 Thus, by limiting
disclosure of a patient's condition to the spouse or sexual partner of the
patient, courts will foster the public health.' 40
Many of the arguments for imposing on a doctor only a limited duty
to warn third persons about his patient's infection with the AIDS virus are
similar to the arguments that the dissent raises in Tarasoff.14 The Tarasoff
dissent explained that imposing on a psychiatrist a duty to warn a potential
victim would frustrate psychiatric treatment and would offer virtually no
benefit to society."42 Similarly, imposing on a doctor a duty to warn all
persons who are likely to be in proximity to an AIDS patient, instead of
only the known sexual partner of the patient, would frustrate AIDS treat-
ment and research and would offer little benefit to society.
143
As the hysteria surrounding AIDS grows, doctors increasingly will
become concerned about their potential liability when a patient transmits
the AIDS virus to a third person. Courts have found that a doctor has a
duty to warn persons who are likely to contract a contagious disease from
the doctor's patient.' 44 In addition, courts have held that a psycotherapist
136. See Gostin & Curran, supra note 40, at 46 (discussing need for voluntary AIDS
testing in effort to control spread of AIDS).
137. See Comment, supra note 40, at 46 (discussing need for voluntary AIDS testing in
effort to control spread of AIDS).
138. See Gostin & Curran, supra note 40, at 46 (discussing need for voluntary testing in
effort to control spread of AIDS). High risk individuals' fear of a doctor's unwarranted
disclosure of AIDS test results would discourage the individuals from seeking testing, coun-
seling, care, and treatment. Id. Persons who avoid testing will continue to spread the disease,
provide no additional AIDS-related information to research efforts, and frustrate public health
objectives. Id.
139. Id. The probable outcome of an investigation into an AIDS carrier's sexual contacts
is that individuals who are at high risk of contracting an HTLV-III infection will hesitate to
undergo testing, thus impeding research efforts. Id. Because investigating a carrier's sexual
relations has limited public health benefits and actually may be counterproductive to achieving
public health goals, doctors should refrain from investigating a patient's sexual contacts. Id.
140. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing need to prevent unnecessary
disclosure to third persons of AIDS test results in effort to control spread of AIDS).
141. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 458, 551 P.2d 334, 358,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 38 (1976) (Clark, J. dissenting); supra note 95 (discussing Tarasoff dissent).
142. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 458, 551 P.2d 334, 358, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 38 (1976) (Clark, J. dissenting); see supra note 95 (discussing Tarasoff dissent).
143. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for imposing on
doctor duty to warn only known sexual partners of AIDS patients).
144. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn
persons who are likely to contract contagious disease from patient).
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has a duty to protect from harm persons whom his patient has threatened. 4
By analogy to a doctor's duty in the contagious disease and psychotherapy
cases, a doctor has a duty to warn an AIDS patient's sexual partner who
is likely to contract the AIDS virus from the patient. 46 The doctor's duty
to warn his AIDS patient's sexual partner, however, directly conflicts with
the doctor's duty to maintain patient confidentiality. 47 This conflict imposes
on a doctor a significant dilemma: whether to warn the sexual partner and
risk violating the doctor's duty to maintain patient confidentiality or refuse
to disclose any of the patient's confidential information and risk violating
the doctor's duty to the sexual partner. One public health official has argued
that the sexual partner's right to know about the patient's AIDS infection
overrides the patient's right to confidentiality. 48 Other commentators argue
that a doctor must not violate patient confidentiality under any circum-
stances. 49 Determining whether an AIDS patient will inform the patient's
sexual partner about the AIDS infection is an impossible task for a doctor.
Thus, forcing a doctor to choose between his competing duties places a
doctor in an unfair, no-win situation. Accordingly, federal and state legis-
latures must resolve the conflict. In resolving the conflict, legislatures must
consider the strong need for confidentiality to encourage voluntary AIDS
testing, society's interest in stopping the spread of AIDS, and the great
burden caused by extending a doctor's liability for falling to warn all
persons of an AIDS patient's diagnosis. 50 A legislative resolution of the
conflict between a doctor's competing duties would notify all concerned
persons of the respective rights and duties relating to a patient's AIDS
diagnosis.
JILL SuzANNE TALBOT
145. See supra notes 73-111 and accompanying text (discussing therapist's duty to warn
foreseeable and identifiable victims of patient's violent propensities).
146. See supra notes 112-43 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to warn
patient's sexual partner that patient has AIDS).
147. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing doctor's duty to maintain
patient confidentiality).
148. See Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1987, at A19, col. 3 (discussing doctor's conflicting duties
of maintaining patient confidentiality and warning AIDS patient's sexual partner). Dr. Stephen
Joseph, New York City's health commisioner, has proposed state legislation that would impose
on doctors and hospitals a clear duty to inform the sexual partners of AIDS patients that the
partner may contract the AIDS virus. Id. The proposed legislation would safeguard physicians
from any liability for having made the disclosure. Id.
149. See id. at A19, col. 4 (discussing whether sexual partner's right to know overrides
AIDS patient's right to confidentiality). The New York State Department of Health argues
that doctors must not disclose to third persons confidential AIDS-related information. Id. The
Department further argues that persons who are at a high risk of contracting AIDS will be
reluctant to volunteer for AIDS testing if they know that doctors will disclose positive test
results to the persons' sexual partners. Id.
150. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing need for confidentiality in
AIDS context).
